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PRESENTATION BY PROFESSOR
DENNIS S. KARJALA
PROFESSOR KARJALA: I have very much enjoyed the discussion so far. Like most law professors, even more than most law professors, I cannot sit still and so you have heard my opinions on much of
this stuff already, but I am glad to have the opportunity to re-emphasize some basic points.
Lenny Bruce used to ask in his nightclub act, "Is there anyone
here I haven't offended?" and then try to offend anyone who raised a
hand. I, like Jessica Litman, feared I might be doing the same thing
with this paper. I told some of my colleagues that Ray Patterson and
Leo Raskind were going to be here, and I was afraid that some of what
I was going to say was going to get their hackles up. I am pleased to
say that, having heard their excellent presentations, I do not think that
there is a lot of disagreement. At least, I do not have a lot to disagree
with in what they have said. They will be able to tell you how much
they disagree with what I am proposing.
I was thinking of this general topic, copyright and misappropriation, for quite some time before the Feist case came down, and that
made me think about it a little bit more. Then when Bob Kreiss called
and asked if I wanted to participate in this symposium, I thought that
would be a good opportunity to force myself to sit down and try to
think through the problem. The idea has been percolating through my
ever-decreasing memory, and I guess the thing that really got me going
was the chance to show another side of my philosophy. To the extent I
am known at all in this field, I am known as a minimalist. I am not a
strong copyright protectionist. I keep telling Jack Brown, who is a lawyer in Phoenix who has very effectively represented any number of
copyright plaintiffs successfully, that he must be one of the best lawyers in the country because I think he has been on the wrong policy
side of every computer software case he has taken and has won every
one of them. He accuses me of wanting to represent or support pirates
all the time, and so now I have the chance to come out very directly in
this paper against piracy. I can announce categorically that I am
against piracy.
Now what got me going on this is the case of Hearn v. Meyer,
which really does not have a direct bearing on the subject of our conference, but I would like you to think about it because it illustrates a
gap in the traditional protection scheme. At least it seems that way to
me.
Published by eCommons, 1991
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Hearn v. Meyer was another Wizard of Oz case. We seem to have
a lot of cases having to do with the Wizard of Oz for some reason. In
this case, the plaintiff had gone to a very rare first edition of the Wizard of Oz, which was published around the turn of the century. Copies
were available only in a few libraries around the country, and in those
editions were some illustrations made by-I forget the fellow's name
who was the original author of the illustrations.
In any event, the illustrations in the book were all in the public
domain because they were published so long ago. And what the plaintiff did, for a new edition of The Wizard of Oz, was a very painstaking
series of copies of these original-edition illustrations, using lots of complicated filtering techniques and even hand-painting blades of grass.
The result was a set of very lovely reproductions of the reproductions.
The original plates, or whatever they used to reproduce paintings in
those days in printing, had long since disappeared. So, the only original, if you will, in this case was a copy in some library somewhere, and
the plaintiff's version was another copy of that first edition copy.
The plaintiff published her reproduction in her new edition, and
then, of course, the defendant in this case photocopied the plaintiff's
work and began selling them in another version of the Wizard of Oz.
The plaintiff sued, and the court denied plaintiff's copyright claim on
the ground there was no originality in her reproduction.
Why isn't there originality? Because, well, that whole picture, the
composition, the coloring, and all that is in the public domain, and the
court was afraid that by recognizing a copyright, it would be removing
the picture from the public domain.
It seems this is the kind of work we want to encourage. It is a
valuable effort, the bringing of an important piece of Americana to
many more people in a lovely form that we can all appreciate, and it is
a kind of activity I think we want to encourage. If much of the effort in
reproducing those paintings can be pirated away, no one is likely to do
it again.
So it seems to me that some sort of limited protection, very limited
protection, against the kind of direct copying that was present in this
case would be useful and would probably not do a lot of harm. It would
not remove the picture from the public domain, because anyone else
could go back to those same libraries, make the same copies, do the
same process, and not infringe. But photocopying what the plaintiff has
done, it seems to me, ought to be held as some sort of an infringement
and the question is how to get there.
It is very difficult to get there under state misappropriation law
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/14
because this is clearly copyright subject matter, and the alleged wrong
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is copying, a right protected by copyright. I think that state misappropriation law would be flatly preempted.
There are various other kinds of works, I began thinking, that are
also subject to piracy. Computer programs are a good example. The
main reason that we elected to protect computer programs under copyright law is that, and this is essentially the thrust of the whole CONTU
report, they are expensive to produce and easy to copy. That is about
the extent of CONTU's empirical analysis, and, as someone pointed
out this morning, empirical evidence of what kinds of works are subject
to piracy is notoriously difficult to find. You will therefore not be surprised when I say I don't have any empirical evidence either, but I
present several kinds of works in my paper that I believe are likely to
be subject to piracy: works like the Hearn reproductions; new typesettings of public domain literary works; electronically stored public domain works; the LEXIS database is an example that we've used; or the
movie database that Jerry Spiegel mentioned this morning those kinds
of things are subject to piracy.
Certain kinds of maps are subject to piracy if somebody has to
work hard to collect the information and someone else can just photocopy them. Works like computer programs and blank forms, things of
this type, are all subject to some sort of piracy. What I am trying to do
is identify the policy tensions that are involved in deciding the level of
protection, if any, that we should afford to these different types of
works.
I start from the proposition that misappropriation, or anti-misappropriation I guess, is a value that is at least implicit in copyright law.
Much of copyright protection does protect against misappropriation.
Now, misappropriation is not the only thing that copyright does or is
intended to protect against. We do protect a number of other aspects of
copyright works. For example, if an artist paints a painting, and somebody else makes a copy of that painting by hand, that would infringe
the copyright. That would not be misappropriation or piracy as I use
the term because the second artist has to invest the same amount of
time and effort and cost of paint and all that kind of stuff as the first
artist does, but it is still infringement. And the reason is that copyright
protects against more than simple piracy, such as photographic reproduction. But implicitly, it does protect against misappropriation because the copyright in the original painting also protects, not just
against hand-painted reproductions, but also against photographic reproductions, for example.
And so the broad copyright in the original painting extends to a
number
of acts that
Published
by eCommons,
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same thing is true of a literary work. You would infringe by photocopying the book. That would be piracy and copyright protects against that.
So why do we need a misappropriation notion in copyright? Copyright seems automatically to protect against misappropriation. Well, it
does in the vast percentage of works, but those are not the ones I am
talking about. I am only talking about those few-there may be more
of them after Feist, I am afraid-that are not protected in their content and nevertheless need some protection against piracy.
I do not quarrel here with Ray Patterson's depiction of the history
of copyright, or its historical function. I am not even arguing against
following his model, saying that copyright is an inappropriate mechanism for these kinds of works, and adopting a different kind of statute-some sort of unfair competition statute. I am certainly not arguing against what Jerry Reichman has proposed as a more
comprehensive view of this whole know-how problem, although those
are not the only kinds of works that I am trying to get within some
limited degree of protection.
I am happy to investigate the possibilities for providing some protection to these works through means other than copyright, but there
are a number of difficulties with relying on the legislative process to
achieve it.
As Steve [Metalitz] pointed out this morning, until we have a consensus it is highly unlikely that we are going to get anywhere, at least
at the national level. That would mean following the status quo, which
in turn would leave these works sitting out in the cold and without any
protection. And Jerry [Reichman] is not even going to give us his
model statute until sometime next year, and then who knows how long
it will take to get it adopted. I would doubt that it will be immediate.
As brilliant as Jerry is, and as much confidence as I have that he will
come up with a good statute, I think it is going take him a while to
convince Congress. So I think legislative action at the national level is
difficult, probably unlikely, and quite unpredictable.
Another modified legislative approach we could take would be to
amend section 301 so that state misappropriation law could play a bigger role. We have hear much talk here about how facts are not federal
copyright subject matter and, therefore, can be the subject of state regulation and protection. Even if true, however, which I doubt very much,
many of the works that I am talking about still could not possibly be
regulated by state law.
I mentioned the LEXIS database yesterday. The cases in the
LEXIS database lose protection not because they are facts, but because
they are unprotected literary works that are in the public domain for
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/14
other reasons. Literary works are copyright subject matter. When the
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act of misappropriation is making a copy, section 301 wipes out state
protection. It just is not available under the current statute and under
the judicial interpretations. Now, I could be wrong on this tomorrow,
as soon as some court changes its preemption analysis, and that may
come as a result of Feist. Leo [Raskind] suggested that that might
occur, but under the current language of the statute, I think these actions are almost entirely preempted.
But we could amend section 301. That would be a more limited
kind of statutory reform, but there are also problems in relying on state
misappropriation law. One reason is the obvious objection that whenever you go to state law, you create lack of uniformity: Sometimes
nonuniformity may not be a bad idea, at least until we have some better idea or a consensus underlying view of what the policy goal is. The
thing about this area, and that is what I am trying to show in this
paper, is that we basically understand at least what the policy tensions
are, if not what the single policy goal is. Federal courts have been wrestling with these tensions for quite a long time and are rather used to
doing it under copyright law. I worry about relying on state courts to
effectively draw the correct balances among these social policy tensions
through their individual approaches to misappropriation, whatever they
might be.
So I think there are problems with relying on legislation at the
national level and other problems with relying on misappropriation at
the state level, even if we could do it without preemption. So I think it
is worth at least asking, until we get better legislation, what can we do
with copyright. Is there a way to interpret copyright that does not do a
lot of damage, that does not overprotect for the very long period of
copyright, and that nevertheless does give some meaningful protection
that provides an incentive for the creation of works that society desires
and gives a decent prospect of return to their.makers?
Let me then just mention what I think the policy tensions are that
I want to try to balance. Too often, I think, when we start discussing
copyright protection, we hear claims like, "Well, we need an incentive;
more protection means a bigger incentive, so let's give more protection." The other side of the coin is, "No, if you give them protection,
that is going to take stuff out of the public domain; we need free and
open debate, and so we should not protect." And the classic copyright
problem is trying to draw a balance between these kinds of things. We
all know that, we do it everyday in our teaching and in our writing.
But there are other tensions, and it is important to articulate a
little better what they are. One that does not get mentioned explicitly
in much
of the copyright
discussion is this misappropriation notion,
Published
by eCommons,
1991

UNIVERSITY OF'DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:3

probably because it is only implicit in so many of the works that are
protected by copyright.
So, I want to say explicity that anti-misappropriation is a value,
and ask whether there is a danger that some desirable works are going
to be underproduced if we do not give them some form of protection. If
there are such works, then we should try to find at least some limited
protection for them.
Is there anything on the other side that argues against protection?
Often there is and sometimes there is not. We have the standard tensions that are almost always implicit in copyright but are sometimes
forgotten. These are limits on protection through the idea/expression
distinction-we do not want to protect ideas. That is basically a policy
decision that is going to vary with different kinds of works. Fair use
also serves as a limitation on copyright protection.
Functionality raises yet another tension. We do protect some functionality under copyright law now. Some of it is deliberate, as in the
case of computer programs. Some of it, I think, is by accident. I give in
the paper the example of standardized test questions. Many may not
have thought of those as functional works, but in fact they are. They
are tools that seek to measure human psychology or intelligence or
some similar trait. They probe with words instead of needles, but they
are still tools and therefore useful articles.
We do not want to overprotect useful articles for the very long
period of copyright because useful articles by their nature develop and
are improved by incremental advances. Copyright is not really very
good-in fact, it is often rather harmful-as a mode of protection for
useful articles. That is why we have historically not protected very
many useful articles under copyright.
Another limiting factor on protection is our desire to have free and
open exchange of facts and information, and on that basis we often
limit the scope of copyright protection.
What I try to do in the paper is take a series of works and show
how the different policy tensions play out in the varying circumstances.
I start with a set of examples of works that I think call for some protection on the misappropriation branch of this analysis and really do
not meet any countervailing factors. One class is the reproduction of
public domain art works, another is new typographical settings of public domain literary works, and a third-an increasingly important class
of works that is very relevant to the things that we have been discussing here-is the electronic storage of public domain literary works.
Jerry's [Professor Richman's] database on the movies is an example of that. But another example, dearer perhaps to the hearts of acahttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/14
demics, is, for example, the electronic storage of the complete works of
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Kant or of all the Greek philosophers or of the Bible or of Shakespeare,
or what have you. Humanities scholars more and more are seeking to
have these texts in guaranteed accurate electronic form that allows
them to do comparisons and searches through literature that they are
interested in studying in a way that was really impracticable before
electronic searching was possible. A classic example, though, is the
public domain literary work. If you store it on disks for distribution,
what is to stop anybody from making a copy? Under traditional copyright principles, anyone would be free to make copies, even for distribution, and that is what I am suggesting we might consider changing. We
can change it through an interpretation of the originality requirement
that, in fact, does not do any disservice to current copyright law because we are doing essentially what I am suggesting with respect to
other kinds of works. I know it will offend Ray Patterson, and it is not
a traditional approach to originality, but the fact is we are doing it
already for some kinds of works, and I am simply suggesting that we
extend the notion to other works. And the bonus is just gives a little bit
of protection, a thin veneer of protection, that prevents direct photographic type takings of the works but leaves the underlying work in the
public domain.
Now with respect to the public domain art works, there is no functionality to worry about. Nor is there any factual information associated with this kind of artistic work. When we talk about protecting
reproductions, the main goal is to insure that the underlying work remains in the public domain so that anybody who wants to can make
copies of it. So, I am really talking about method of copying, and it is
pretty much the Bonito Boats problem applied to art work. What Florida tried to do in Bonito Boats was to protect against a particular kind
of misappropriative copying. They were unsuccessful because of the
preemption analysis of Bonito Boats, but there is still a misappropriation problem that we ought to address.
What does copyright protect in the case of a movie of a public
domain event, like a demonstration or the Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassination? None of the events shown in the movie are protected. It is just the film itself, the audiovisual work, that comes from
setting the lens, adjusting the camera angle and that sort of thing.
Sound recordings are another example. Sound recordings of a public domain musical work, or as suggested in the House Report bird
calls, include no authorship in the work recorded. The only copyright is
in the sound recording itself, which comes from twiddling the knobs of
the recording device. Given that we recognize copyright in these two
kinds
of works, which
Published
by eCommons,
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sis, for example, to a carefully made reproduction of a public domain
painting.
What is original in such a painting? There is nothing original in
the composition, in the color scheme, or whatever other elements of
painting that the art critics use. But there is, even in the traditional
terms, a lot of judgment involved in making such a work. You have got
to mix paint, and you have got to decide what brush to use, you have to
decide what elements of the composition go on first, and all that sort of
thing. There is a lot more judgment involved in that than there is in
taking a snapshot, and we protect snapshots. Yet, as Hearn v. Meyer
indicates, we do not often protect these public domain art
reproductions.
If you go to a museum, you see art students doing these reproductions, sometimes of public domain paintings. You can usually see a
pretty clear difference, and these are good student artists. I could not
come close. They are very skilled, and yet, you can see a pretty big
difference between their work and what is hanging on the wall. But
their goal is to reproduce what is hanging on the wall. They would like
to do it perfectly. They do not wish to add a distinguishable variation
to the Mona Lisa; that does not make sense. Anyone buying an oil copy
of the Mona Lisa would like it to be as close to the original as possible.
That is the socially desirable work. That is the socially desirable work
in Hearn v. Meyer. That is the socially desirable work in the one case
that did come out for protection, Alva Studios v. Winninger, Rodin's
Hand of God sculpture case.
So, to encourage the dissemination of these kinds of reproductions,
we might at the very least give the artists a limited copyright
through-what I call for my students-the brush stroke theory of originality. And it follows from some of the interpretations of the Alfred
Bell case.
The actual strokes on the canvas are what our reproducing artist
contributes to her copy. If you, too, reproduce the original painting by
looking at her copy and make another one by hand, all you are taking
is the composition and the color scheme of the original, and that is not
protected. But if you take a photograph, you are getting at least some
of her brush strokes, and you are taking what the artist has added. The
great thing about this approach is that it gets you exactly where you
want to be; at least, it gets me where I want to be which is a little
protection for the reproducer, who is protected against photographic
copying, and the original remains in the public domain. I think it is a
good result.
Similarly, in the Batlin case, the Uncle Sam bank case, I would
not have denied the copyright altogether as the court did. I would have
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/14
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recognized a very limited copyright that protected essentially against
plug mold copying. If you want to copy either the original or the new
plastic version, it is okay as long as you are making your own molds.
But why should we allow people simply to take that new plastic bank,
put some Styrofoam around it, or whatever they use to make molds,
and then churn out direct knockoff? I do not think there was plug mold
copying in the actual Batlin case. I could not really tell from the opinion, but if there was not such copying in the case, non-infringement
was probably correct, even under my analysis.
But the point is that a very thin copyright could have been recognized without doing a lot of damage to traditional principles. As a matter of fact, these are the kinds of works that are traditionally protected,
and perhaps we can even classify copyright denials in these cases as a
mistake-the courts are simply misconstruing how they should interpret copyright law with respect to these works.
. I have a harder time, however, especially after Feist, in dealing
with electronic storage of public domain text. There is no real judgment; it is just someone banging away at the typewriter and entering
the stuff in electronic form. Probably even a photograph has more individual creativity than that.
So, if Feist applies outside of the area of factual compilations, this
theory is not going to work. I do not know how broad Feist is. If the
Court was serious about the constitutional analysis and they are going
to stick with it, nothing of what I am suggesting here is perhaps
possible.
But I am assuming that either Justice O'Connor was not serious.
about the constitutional analysis or that the holding is limited, if not to
the specific facts, at least to factual compilations, for which there was a
statutory answer to the problem. Justice O'Connor did not need to go
to the Constitution, and to that extent the constitutional analysis is
dictum.
Finally, if I have to, I will just say that Congress, notwithstanding
any contrary language in Feist relating to the Patent and Copyright
Clause, is authorized, under the Commerce Clause, to protect, at least,
any published works of the kinds that I am talking about. Congress
could do so under copyright law if it so chooses, and if it wants to write
a new statute and call it misappropriation or unfair competition, it
could do that too. I think The Trademark Cases and the validity and
the constitutionality of the Lanham Act confirm this analysis. So, this
issue largely remains one of congressional intent.
Now let us get back to electronic storage of texts. What can we do
to protect those? What is the contribution here that calls for some protection?
The contribution
is taking the printed text and putting it into a
Published
by eCommons,
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different form, going from the written word to the electronic one. The
text itself is obviously not protected. Any of us could buy that compact
disk, call the work to the screen, and retype it into our own database
and we ought to be able to do that without infringing any intellectual
property rights. But I do not see the social policy of allowing people to
make copies for their friends, that is, disk-to-disk type copying. We can
get to that result by recognizing a copyright in the process of entering
the information.
Now I am stuck on another aspect of Feist which is this requirement for intellectual creativity. There is not any in my storage effort;
there is not any in the storage of Jerry's movie database; there isn't any
in the LEXIS database. We have got a lot of these things where the
whole valuable contribution is effort, getting the thing in electronic
form. There may be some judgment in verifying the form, but I am not
sure that rises to the level of creativity that Feist had in mind.
But the requirement for intellectual creativity is pretty minimal
anyway. We protect the descriptions on the labels of hair care products-at least one case says we do. This field is kind of a boomerang.
You do not know exactly where the Bleistein analysis is going to take
over and where it is not. We have denied, on creativity grounds, protection in some works, like the New York Arrows logo in the John Muller
case, that strike me as reasonably creative.
But I do not see what purpose the intellectual creativity requirement is serving. I understand that it has been there. I understand the
Europeans like to have it in their copyright law, but the fact is it was
not a part of our copyright law in the early days. Jane Ginsburg elaborated on this at great length in her article last year, and I just refer to
that and will not repeat all the historical analysis. She has done an
admirable job.
In any event, intellectual creativity is not a line that really divides
the kinds of intellectual property protection very well. There is intellectual creativity in lots of patentable inventions, probably most, but we
do not require it. It is not a necessary condition nor is it sufficient. It is
not a sufficient condition of copyright either. I give the example again
of Einstein's theory of relativity. That is not protected by either patent
or copyright law, but it is very creative. So intellectual creativity is not
a sufficient condition of protection. It is neither necessary nor sufficient
in trade secret law. I do not see any reason for having it in copyright
law, and, especially given the difficulty of getting new legislation, it
seems to me that the time has come, contrary to the spirit of Feist, to
drop this requirement to zero. It is clearly pretty close to zero now
anyway.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/14
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If we do that, then we can protect these electronically stored texts.
We can also protect databases, at least databases whose contents are
literary works, such as Jerry's [Professor Richman's] movie database.
We could protect those, although perhaps not factual compilations
themselves. New typography of public domain works follows the same
kind of analysis and would get limited protection.
In all these kinds of works the theory works out really nicely. You
have got limited protection, very thin protection against essentially piratical copying-copying by mechanical means. When you copy the
CD-ROM, you are taking precisely what the author has contributed,
which is the new electronic form of the work. If you copy from the
screen, all you are taking is what Kant wrote a century or two ago. So
that works nicely. At least as far as these works are concerned, I do not
see much social policy on the other side of the problem for denying this
level of protection, and I see some value, at least in terms of the incentive rationale.
Okay. Now we go on to a middle class of works that are a little.
more difficult because we have some anti-protective policies as well as
the anti-misappropriation protective policy coming into the balance.
The best example here is maps, and, in particular, I would like to call
your attention to the maps in the Rockford Map case.
That one, you will recall, is the case where the plaintiff went to the
deed recorder's office and read the dusty books of legal jargon, as the
court said, and translated that metes and bounds information into a
picture showing a square block of some county somewhere, all the individual land plots and the names of the owners.
These were plain vanilla maps. There was no color scheme; there
was not a lot of filigree, none of the lovely dragons you find on a medieval map. None of that stuff was there. It was just a straightforward
map, purely factual information, hard to get, hard to coax out of those
records, a lot of work. Not much creativity was involved, but these was
a lot of work. It seems to me that those maps are deserving, of at least
some protection. And we are not going to get those maps, I think,. unless we offer some protection, or, at least I think there is that danger.
How do you get there? Again, we have got to get rid of this intellectual creativity requirement or we have one of two bad results. First,
we may pick an artificial requirement like you were trying to get Jerry
[Richman] to do in his database, which would add a whole bunch of
stuff no one really wants but is just stuck in there so you can get a
copyright. Okay. That is fine. You are going to get a copyright, but it
still does not help the mapmaker because anyone is still free to copy the
rest of the map without taking that added fluff. It is not necessary for
the user; the user 1991
does not even want it. It is cluttering up the map.
Published by eCommons,
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They just want to hang it on the wall in the real estate office so they
can quickly tell who lives where. They do not want a lot of that other
stuff in there. So the value of this map.is the factual information that is
portrayed in a bare bones fashion. I still say that is deserving of some
protection, but you do not get that through a copyright based on creative add-on fluff.
The second bad result follows from an argument we have heard a
number of times today, which is that selection of the information ought
to be protected. I think that is a disastrous approach. Feist is forcing us
in that direction, and that is what I am encouraging you to resist. Because what is the selection? Somebody has chosen to show every square
block in the city or the county. That kind of selection is idea, or at least
it is functional in the sense that that is what the users want. They want
all the information, not a series of isolated square blocks.
I do not think creativity of selection is a very good rationale for
protection. It can overprotect, as I have argued several times, and it
can underprotect because there might not be any selection when you
have a complete set of information, for example, when you show a
whole county in this form. We really need some other notion.
Now, the problem with protected maps, as I argue in my paper, is
drawing the line. Do we limit the scope of protection to photocopying
and tracing or should we extend the copyright a little and say you can
not even take your compass and protractor, or whatever the equivalent
tools are these days, measure the lines and shapes and then draw your
own map? My guess is that even that second activity, where you do not
photocopy but simply measure all the distances and draw your own
map from that, probably would undercut a good deal of the original
mapmaker's effort and act as a disincentive to original production.
So there is an argument that we might protect against a little
more than what I call pure piracy. The problem is that many maps
contain nothing but the factual information. How do we draw the
scope-of-protection line? I will not try to elaborate here. I try to deal
with that at some length in the paper, probably not entirely successfully, but I will not try to develop it here.
The important point is that this is not a pure misappropriation
case. We are not going to throw copyright at it just because we have
the danger of misappropriation. We have another tension pulling from
the other side-the danger of protecting factual information-that we
have to think about when we are trying to formulate the scope of protection. I do think we can handle it within the traditional copyright
framework, however, especially with a careful application of the fair
use standard.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/14

1992]

PRESENTATION OF PROFESSOR KARJALA

There is yet another class of works whose protection does not require any change in the intellectual creativity standard, in other words,
they do not meet the originality requirement of a traditional copyright,
even in a Feist sense and they are subject to piracy. On the other hand,
these works also invoke some anti-protective policies that we want to
make sure we deal with explicitly. These are works that involve some
functionality.
The examples I give in the paper are, first, computer programs. I
have written about this program at length-some people think too
much length-in the past. The problem with overprotecting programs
and treating them as if they are novels is that you end up protecting
function too strongly. Consequently, we again need to balance. Antimisappropriation policy calls for protection of programs against diskto-disk, ROM-to-ROM, and similar electronic copying, perhaps also
against simple translations from one language to another, but I do not
think we need much more than that in order to give the appropriate
production incentives. To protect more also runs the risk of protecting
simple technological advances for the very long period of copyright.
Another kind of functional work is one I mentioned earlier, standardized test questions. Those I think are an interesting example because the kind of piracy to which they are subject is not the kind that
we normally think of in the case of literary works. It is not the fact that
you have taken the expressive language of the question.
The reason that you need protection against piracy is that these
tests have to be validated and that is a very expensive process. What
happens is the testmakers make up a whole bunch of questions. They
do not really know which ones are going to work and which ones are
not. They just make up a whole bunch. And when they get.done, they
have got to validate them. That is the hard, expensive part. They end
up throwing out half of them or so because they do not measure what
they want to measure, and they keep the ones that work. It is that
effort of validation that I think argues for protection. If it were not for
that, I would say these things are functional and we should not protect
them at all. But we do have a danger of misappropriation of the validation effort here, and I think that might call for some protection.
But the interesting question is how these balances work out. If
somebody could come along and offer the same test by copying the
questions and selling the whole test, he would easily defeat the primary
market for the original testmaker which comprised the inducement to
make the test in the first place. So I think the questions deserve some
protection against copying for competition in the primary market.
But some cases are like ETS v. Katzman, where the competition
was
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was copying ETS' questions. Why? Because he could not make one up
and score his own questions? Of course not. He could make one up, but
he does not know whether it works. That is, anybody can write substantive questions involving, say, the square root of three, but he was not
trying to test that. He was trying to test how well the students were
going to do on their college entrance tests. As for success in college
itself, he might have had a better test than ETS, but no one was going
to use his test because ETS had the primary market monopoly.
So, the students are going to take ETS' test, and if they are going
to practice to take ETS tests, they are going to have to use ETS questions, and that is the reason Katzman wanted to use their questions.
Not to allow him to do so is to allow ETS' primary market copyright to
also control the secondary market for a functional work. I do not think
we should not give so much protection to works that are essentially
functional.
Finally, and I will end up here, we have the question of blank
forms. Again, Baker v. Selden tells us those are functional. I've always
thought they were functional, or at least section 102(b) unprotected
systems for presenting information. I still think Kregos is wrong for
that reason.
But I will concede a little bit. Consider, for example, in the Bibbero case, involving a medical form, the court actually denied the copyright. I basically applaud that result, except when you read the facts
carefully you find that the Bibbero defendant did not just copy the
form but rather photocopied it and was selling photocopies by the
thousands.
It seems to me that we can and should give to form-makers such
minimal protection as flows from a requirement that any competitor
that is going to copy the form set its own type. It takes a little more
time to get into competition and involves at least a little extra expense
before others can start competing. It may not be much protection, but I
think it has some meaning and perhaps should be considered. But functionality considerations mean that we do not want to give it too much.
The question is one of balancing anti-misappropriation policy against
noncopyrightability of function and systems. So with that, I will stop.
Thank you very much.
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